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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIAL J. PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20020341-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the.provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the warrantless search of 
Peterson's personal belongings was justified under an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition against such searches? A trial court's factual findings that 
underlie its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error 
while the trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness with a measure of 
discretion given to the judge's application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. 
Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 388 (Utah App. 1996), affirmed by, 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all controlling statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
Danial J. Peterson appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable James R. Taylor, Fourth District Court, after he was convicted by a jury of 
possession or use of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor. 
B, Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Danial Peterson was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on 
January 8, 2002, with the following criminal violations: possession or use of 
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(a) (R. 6-7). 
On January 16, 2002, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable James 
R. Taylor at which time Peterson was bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding 
of probable cause; and pleas of "not guilty" were entered (R. 21-22, 205). 
On January 18, 2002, Peterson filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on grounds 
that the search of his personal property constituted an illegal warrantless search under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 24-30). On January 24, 2002, a 
suppression hearing was held before Judge Taylor (R. 85, 210). At the close of the 
hearing, Judge Taylor denied the motion concluding that the search of Peterson's coat 
was justified as a Terry frisk (R. 210 at 52, 54). On January 25, 2002, Peterson filed a 
motion to reconsider the ruling denying his motion to suppress (R. 118-22). 
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On January 25, 2002, Peterson filed a Motion to Submit Judgment on Warrantless 
Search of Shoes asserting that while the trial court "previously held that the search of Mr. 
Peterson's coat was justified by the warrant exception articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968),... no finding or ruling was made as to the warrantless search of Mr. 
Peterson's shoes" (R. 107). 
On January 28, 2002, a jury trial was held with Judge Taylor presiding (R. 127, 
212). Peterson renewed his motion to suppress at trial (R. 212 at 175-76). After 
deliberation, the jury convicted Peterson of possession of drug-paraphernalia in a drug-
free zone, a class A misdemeanor, and the lesser-included charge of possession/use of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony (R. 126, 129, 212 at 204). 
On March 27, 2002, Peterson was sentenced to concurrent terms of 0-1 years and 
0-5 years at the Utah State Prison (R. 193-94, 211). 
On April 26, 2002, Peterson, through current counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal in 
Fourth District Court (R. 198). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Provo City police officer Russ Billings was dispatched on December 28, 2001, to 
974 West 600 South, #7B, on a report that adult individuals at the residence were using 
drugs in front of children (R. 205 at 6; 212 at 105-08). Billings and at least four other 
officers-including Officer Woodall-knocked on the door of the residence to do a 
welfare check on the children (R. 205 at 6, 20). An older lady answered the door and 
informed Billings that her daughter, Dawn Webster, was the tenant (R. 205 at 7; 212 at 
108). 
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Webster then came to the door (R. 212 at 108). Billings informed Webster of the 
purpose of the visit and asked if they could do a check of the residence to make sure the 
children were safe (R. 205 at 7). According to Billings, Webster gave consent to enter 
the residence; and that she gave him subsequent permission to search her room and any 
belongings therein (R. 205 at 7-8). According to Webster, she gave the officers consent 
to enter the residence and to do a "walk through" of the residence to check on the welfare 
of her children, but that she did not consent to a search of her bedroom or closet (R. 205 
at 33, 35). 
The apartment has two bedrooms, two baths, a livingroom and kitchen (R. 210 at 
5). Billings then proceeded immediately with Webster to a bedroom upstairs and down a 
short hallway where Webster's baby was sleeping (R. 210 at 5; 212 at 109). 
Approximately 3-5 seconds after entering the room which was slightly darkened, 
Peterson came out of the closet quickly wearing a light shirt and no shoes (R. 205 at 7-8; 
210 at 6, 8, 9, 15-16; 212 at 109-110, 156). Webster was surprised by Peterson's 
presence in the room because she believed he was in the kitchen with her mother (R. 205 
at 33). Billings was also "startled" by Peterson's presence but then told Peterson to stop, 
to turn around, and to place his hands where they could be seen (R. 205 at 8; 210 at 9-10; 
212 at 110). Peterson complied and was placed in handcuffs and patted down for 
weapons by Billings (R. 205 at 8; 210 at 10, 17; 212 at 138). Another officer then 
escorted Peterson out to the front of the house and sat him down on the porch where he 
remained handcuffed (R. 205 at 9; 210 at 11, 18, 19; 212 at 122). Billings noticed no 
signs of drug use in regards to Peterson (R. 210 at 13). At the time Peterson was 
handcuffed there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime (R. 210 at 
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21). Billings also testified that there was nothing in the closet which appeared to be 
obviously related to drug use (R. 205 at 22). 
After Peterson was taken outside, Billings noticed a brown coat on the floor of the 
closet where Peterson had been standing (R. 212 at 11, 138). Billings verified through 
Webster and a female child who entered the bedroom that the coat belonged to Peterson 
(R. 205 at 9, 17, 22; 210 at 11, 13). Billings planned to take the coat to Peterson because 
of the cold weather (R. 210 at 15; 212 at 31, 112). Billings patted down the coat and felt 
a syringe in the right pocket (R. 205 at 9; 210 at 11; 212 at 112). Billings removed the 
syringe and discovered it was filled with a clear, brownish liquid (R. 205 at 10). Billings 
field tested the substance in the syringe and it showed positive for methamphetamine (R. 
205 at 16).1 
Peterson did not ask Billings to bring him a coat (R. 210 at 20). There was 
nothing about the coat or about the surrounding circumstances that caused Billings to 
believe that there might be a weapon in the coat (R. 210 at 20). Moreover, Billings 
admitted that there really was no issue as to officer safety in regards to the coat unless— 
and/or until—the coat was taken by the officers to Peterson (R. 210 at 22). In addition, 
the officers never asked Webster's permission to go into the closet and retrieve a coat nor 
did they ask permission to get some shoes for Peterson (R. 205 at 38). 
After Billings found the syringe in the coat, Officer Woodall found a pair of shoes 
between the bed and the closet on the far side of the bedroom (R. 212 at 166). Inside the 
shoes, Woodall found a baggy foil of syringes (R. 205 at 9, 26-27; 212 at 118-19, 166-
67). Billings discovered the shoes belonged to Peterson when they were taken outside 
!At trial the parties stipulated that tests by the State Crime Lab on the substance showed 
that the substance was in fact methamphetamine (R. 212 at 153, 155). 
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and Peterson was asked if he wanted his shoes (R. 205 at 13; 212 at 131-32). Peterson 
responded affirmatively and Billings put down the shoes next to him (R. 205 at 15; 212 
at 131 -32. 157). Peterson was then placed under arrest but was not read any rights per 
Miranda (R. 205 at 24). 
Billings testified that after he went outside with the coat and shoes he noticed 
signs that Peterson had used drugs (R. 210 at 21; 212 at 123, 130-31). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Peterson asserts that the search of his coat and shoes constituted warrantless 
searches under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution that were not 
justified either by probable cause or as an officer safety search under Terry v. Ohio. 
Accordingly, Peterson asks that this Court correct the legal conclusion of the trial court 
that these warrantless searches were justified on grounds of "officer safety" and order 
that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court for new trial proceedings with 
instructions that the evidence is to be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF PETERSON'S COAT AND SHOES 
WERE NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER AN EXCE PTION TO THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION AGAINST SUCH SEARCHES 
Peterson asserts that the warrantless searches of his coat and shoes were not 
justified or permissible under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition 
against warrantless searches. Accordingly. Peterson requests that this Court reverse his 
convictions, correct the trial court's legal conclusion that these warrantless searches were 
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justified and remand this matter back to the Fourth District Court for new proceedings 
with instructions that the evidence is to be suppressed. 
The presumptive rule under Fourth Amendment case law is that ''Warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citing Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). In 
addition, the "State must demonstrate 'that the circumstances of the seizure constitute an 
exception to the warrant requirement.'" Wells, 928 P.2d at 389 (quoting State v. 
Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 985 (Utah App. 1992). In this case, the trial court concluded 
that the search of Peterson's coat (and presumably shoes) was justified as part of a Terry 
frisk for reasons of officer safety: 
The nub of this case falls on whether or not [the officer] was justified in 
picking up that coat and checking it for weapons. We don't... We expect officers 
to act reasonably and we, we consider whether or not they're reasonable by 
looking at the totality of the circumstances. I can only imagine (short inaudible) 
Barney Fife conducting a search, making sure that the man had no weapons, and 
then turning around and handing him the weapon. How dumb is that. If, if 
there's a reason to make certain that the man has no weapon and to remove him 
from danger, and then immediately as a matter of courtesy hand him a coat but not 
check it for weapons that's, that's ludicrous. 
And so my finding is that the, the retrieval of the coat because of the 
totality of the circumstances was so closely related in time that it was reasonably 
related to removing him from the room, and that it was practically and reasonably 
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necessary to simply pat the coat and make sure that he wasn't undoing what he 
had just done by conducting the Terry frisk. 
Therefore, I deny the motion 
(R. 210at52).2 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "In Terry [v. Ohio], the Supreme Court 
established a narrowly drawn exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement that 
police obtain a warrant for all searches. Where a police officer validly stops an 
individual for investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes that the individual 
may be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a 'frisk' or ;pat-down' search of 
the individual to discover weapons that might be used against him." State v. Carter, 707 
P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985). See also, State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, f 13, 37 P.3d 
270. "Although it ;is not essential that an officer actually have been in fear' to perform a 
Terry frisk, the State must present articulable facts that would reasonably lead an 
objective officer to conclude that the suspect may be armed. 'A mere unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch is not sufficient.'" Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at f 14 (quoting Carter, 
101 P.2d at 659). 
Traditionally two basic scenarios have warranted a Terry frisk: One, where "facts 
and circumstances unique to the particular suspect and/or factual context may give rise to 
a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed, such as a suspect with a bulge in his 
clothing that appears to be a weapon or a suspect who is hesitant in denying that he is 
armed and aggressively approaches the officer immediately after being stopped." 
2Peterson also challenged the warrantless search of his shoes (R. 30, 107). 
However, the trial court never ruled on the validity of the search of the shoes. Peterson 
asserts that the analysis governing the justification and validity of the search of the coat is 
applicable to the search of the shoes. 
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Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at f 15 (citations omitted). Two, where "the inherent nature 
of the crime being investigated leads to the reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be 
armed." Id 
Peterson asserts that the scenario presented here is akin to the first scenario set 
forth above where the "facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect and/or 
factual context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed." 
Peterson also concedes that the frisk of his person was justified given the totality of the 
circumstances as listed by the trial court: darkened room, presence of child, investigation 
of potential drug use, surprise, quick exit from the closet and approach towards officer 
(R. 210 at 51). 
However, at issue here, is not the search or frisk of Peterson's person but the 
search of his coat and shoes after he has been patted-down, hand-cuffed and removed 
from the apartment by other officers. The trial court concluded that the search of the coat 
and shoes was "reasonably related to removing [Peterson] from the room" and that the 
search of the coat was justified for reasons of officer safety under the assumption that to 
give Peterson the coat (and presumably shoes) without searching it for weapons would 
completely defeat the purpose of frisking him in the first place (R. 210 at 52). 
But in reaching this conclusion the trial court has overlooked several important 
facts: One, that the officers did not notice the presence of the coat and the shoes on the 
bedroom floor until after Peterson had been patted-down, handcuffed and removed from 
the premise (R. 212 at 11, 138, 166). Two, Peterson never asked for the coat (R. 210 at 
20). Three, there was nothing about the coat or about the surrounding circumstances that 
caused Officer Billings to believe that there might be a weapon in the coat as it lay on the 
bedroom floor (R. 210 at 20). In fact, Billings admitted that there really was no issue as 
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to officer safety in regards to the coat unless-or until-the coat was taken b> the officers 
to Peterson (R. 210 at 22). Four, at the time Peterson was handcuffed and removed from 
the premise there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime (R. 210 at 
21). Five, Billings admitted that there was nothing in the closet which appeared to be 
obviously related to drug use (R. 205 at 22). 
Peterson asserts that while under the totality of the circumstances set forth above 
the officers were justified in conducting a Terry frisk of his person, the trial court erred 
in concluding that the subsequent searches of his coat and shoes-which were not on his 
person nor under his control-were also justified under an officer safety exception to the 
Fourth Amendment when there were no articulable facts present that would reasonably 
lead an objective officer to conclude that his safety was endangered by the presence of 
said coat and shoes on the bedroom floor. Accordingly, Peterson asks that this Court 
reverse his convictions and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Peterson 
also requests that the matter be remanded to the Fourth District with instructions that all 
evidentiary w6fruits of the violation" be suppressed. State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 919 
(UtahApp. 1995). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Peterson asks that this Court reverse his convictions 
and remand this matter to the Fourth District Court with instructions that the evidence is 
to be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of December, 2002. 
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Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 9th day of December, 
2002. 
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JARED W. ELDRIDGE (#8176) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorney for Defendant 
245 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, Stat* of Utah 
$0^ - Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DANIEL PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Case No. 021400075 
JUDGE TAYLOR 
The Defendant, DANIEL PETERSON, through his attorney, JARED W. ELDRIDGE, 
moves this court to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search of Mr. Peterson's 
coat and shoes. In support of this motion, the Defendant has filed the accompanying Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion to Suppress Warrantless Search of Personal Property. 
Mr. Peterson requests that this matter be scheduled for oral arguments before the jury trial 
on January 28. 
DATED this \6 day of January, 2002 
;JJ> W/ELDRIDkffi JAREI 
Attorney for Defendant 
JARED W. ELDRIDGE (#8176) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorney for Defendant 
245 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DANIEL PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS WARRANTLESS 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Case No. 021400075 
JUDGE TAYLOR 
FACTS1 
On December 28, 2001 Officer Billings responded to 974 w! 600 S., Apt. 7B to conduct 
a welfare check. The welfare check was based on a report from an anonymous caller who 
reported that children in the apartment were being exposed to methamphetamine. 
Upon arrival at the apartment, Officer Billings along with three other officers knocked on 
the door of the apartment. The door was answered by an older woman. The officers spoke briefly 
1
 These facts are based on my memory of testimony given at the preliminary hearing. A 
transcript of the preliminary hearing has been requested and should be available for review to 
correct any mistakes before this motion is argued. 
with this woman and then another younger woman came to the door. The younger woman 
identified herself as Dawn Webster who resided at the apartment. The officers asked Ms. 
Webster if they could come in to do a welfare check on the kids. Ms. Webster indicated at the 
preliminary hearing that the specific request of the officers was to do a '\valk through" of the 
residence in order to check the welfare of the children. Ms. Webster consented to allow the 
officers to do a "walk through" of the apartment. 
The first room checked was a bedroom. As officers entered the bedroom, a man quickly 
came out of a closet and took two or three steps toward Officer Billings. Officer Billings verbally 
told the man to stop and turn around. The man complied with the officer's orders without 
argument or incident. The officer's then handcuffed the man with his hands behind his back. The 
officers discovered that the man was Daniel Peterson. Due to Mr. Peterson's behavior, Officer 
Billings believed that he may have been under the influence of an illicit drug. 
After Mr. Peterson was placed in handcuffs he was taken to the front porch area of the 
apartment, still in handcuffs. Officer Billings saw in the closet where Mr. Peterson had been a 
coat that was on the floor. Officer Billings picked up the coat and asked who's coat it was. A 
child as well as Ms. Webster told Officer Billings that the coat belonged to Mr. Tetcrson. 
Officer Webster then felt the coat and felt in a pocket what he presumed to be a syringe. 
Officer Webster could not see what was inside of the pocket so he looked in a saw that in fact a 
syringe was in the pocket. Officer Billings removed the syringe from the pocket and observed 
that it was filled with a liquid. A subsequent field test indicated that the substance tested positive 
for methamphetamine. 
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After the syringe with the liquid in it was discovered, Officer Billings considered Mr. 
Peterson to be "under arrest." Another officer then went back into the bedroom and looked under 
the bed. The officer saw a pair of shoes under the bed and found inside the shoes several more 
syringes. These syringes were removed, the shoes where taken to the front porch area and Mr. 
Peterson identified the shoes as belonging to him. 
As officer's continued to search the residence, they found some scales and baggies inside 
of a hollowed out VCR. 
ARGUMENT 
"Searches and seizures are per se unreasonable if concluded outside the judicial process 
and without a warrant, unless the exigencies of the situation justify an exception." State v. Lee, 
633 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1981), see also, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507,19 
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). The Utah Supreme Court has described exigent circumstances as, "namely, 
to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence." State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1984). Furthermore, "the State must demonstrate 'that the 
circumstances of the seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement.'" State v. Wells, 
928 P.2d 386, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
I. STANDING 
In order to have standing to challenge a search, a defendant must have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. State v. Lova, 2001 UT App 3, f 10. A two pronged approached is 
applied to determine if an individual has an expectation of privacy. Id "First, the individual must 
have a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, that subjective expectation of privacy must 
be reasonable." Id. 
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It is undisputed that the coat and shoes that were searched belonged to Mr. Peterson. 
Certainly a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in what might be inside of a pocket 
of a coat or inside of a person's shoes. Furthermore, that subject expectation of privacy is 
reasonable. 
Since the items searched unequivocally belonged Mr. Peterson and he has a privacy 
interest in those items, undoubtedly he can challenge the warrantless search of his personal 
property. 
II. CONSENT 
In order for the State to establish it's burden to show voluntary consent was given to 
search, 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently given"; (2) the government must prove 
consent was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) the 
courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were 
waived. 
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 467 (1991 Utah Ap.). 
At the preliminary hearing, when the prosecutor asked Ms. Webster if she ever gave the 
officers consent to search her bedroom, Ms. Webster responded that she did not ever give 
consent to search. Ms. Webster indicated that she did give consent to the officers to do a "walk 
through" of the residence in order to check on the welfare of the children. Clearly, based on the 
testimony the State elicited, there was no clear and positive testimony that consent to do anything 
more than a simple "walk through" was unequivocal and specific or freely and voluntarily given. 
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When the State asked Ms. Webster whether she ever objected to officers searching her 
bedroom, she responded that she did not object. However, Ms. Webster went on to clarify that 
she was frightened because of the number of officers and some of them were yelling at her and 
telling her that they could search her house. Ms. Webster also stated that believed, based on what 
the officers told her, that she could not object to their search. 
The situation described by Ms. Webster seems to indicate that the officers exceed1 the 
scope of the consent they had obtained, to do a "walk through" in order to check on the welfare 
of the children. Furthermore, any permission perceived by the officers to deviate from a mere 
"walk through" to a search of coats, shoes under the bed and the inside of a VCR appears to have 
been obtained through duress or coercion, express or implied. 
Clearly the testimony of Ms. Webster raises a significant concern that if any consent to 
conduct an actual search was given, that it was obtained through duress or coercion, express or 
implied. Additionally, any perceived consent to search does not appear to be "unequivocal and 
specific" or "freely and intelligently given." IdL 
Finally, given that "the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were 
waived", the facts elicited at the preliminary hearing certainly do not amount to convincing 
evidence that fundamental constitutional rights were waived in order to allow not just a "walk 
through" to check on the welfare of the children, but a full blown search of the apartment. Id. 
In applying this analysis to the facts at hand, it is clear the officers did not have consent to 
do anything more than to conduct a "walk through" of the apartment in order to check on the 
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welfare of the children. Any search of the coat, under the bed, of the shoes or of the VCR was 
clearly in excess of the consent given and are therefore illegal. 
III. PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Even if the Court were to find that the officers had consent to search the apartment, such 
consent cannot extend to items the officers clearly knew, without doubt, belonged to Mr. 
Peterson and were his personal property. Without some other justification, the search of Mr. 
Peterson's personal property violated his privacy interest in his own personal property and is 
guaranteed by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the 
Umted States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above authorities and arguments, Mr. Peterson respectfully requests this 
Court to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search-of-his-personal 
property. 
DATED this day of January, 2002. 
JARED W. ELDRIDGE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
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v. 
DANIEL PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Case No. 021400075 
JUDGE TAYLOR 
The Defendant, DANIEL PETERSON, through his attorney, JARED W. ELDRIDGE, 
moves this court to reconsider its denial of his motion suppress the illegal warrantless search of 
his personal property. The Defendant directs the Court's attention to the following authorities in 
support of his motion to reconsider. 
ANALYSIS 
In finding that Officer Billings had a reasonable articulable suspicion that his safety was 
in danger this Court found that factors that justified the officer's suspicion were that there had 
been an anonymous report of drug use in the apartment, that the officer's experience was that in 
such a situation his safety is always a concern, that the room where Mr. Peterson was found was 
darkened and that Mr. Peterson was hiding in a closet and came out quickly. 
3Jk%. 
First, it is a long held legal principle that an anonymous informant is considered to have a 
very low level of credibility absent other corroborating factors. State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT 
App. 332, f 15, |19; Kavsville Citv v. Mulchav. 943 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The factors to be considered in determining the 
reliability of an anonymous informant are: 1) the type of informant, 2) whether the informant 
gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a search or seizure and that a 
tip is more reliable if the informant observed the details personally rather than relaying 
information from a third party, and 3) whether police officer's personal observations confirm the 
dispatcher's report of the informants tip. Valenzuela. at f 15. Before the Court can find it was 
reasonable for an officer to consider the informant's information in forming his "reasonable 
suspicion" of fear for his safety, this analysis needs to be satisfied. 
Clearly in this case there was an anonymous tip of drug use in the apartment. Apart from 
that information there is nothing in the record that would satisfy the analysis set out above. Thus, 
it would be unreasonable for an officer to base any safety concern on information gleaned from 
an anonymous source. 
Next, the Court found that due to the officer's experience in similar situations, looking 
for evidence involving drug use, the officer was justified in "fearing for his safety." However, in 
a recent Court of Appeal Case, the Court disagrees with this analysis. 
In State v.Warren, an officer observed a grey Cadillac pulled to the side of the road in the 
early morning hours in downtown Salt Lake City. 2001 UT App. 346, f 2. The officer observed 
another individual leaning in the side window of the car. Id. The officer suspected, based on the 
early hours, the poor lighting and nature of the area that some sort of drug or prostitution activity 
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The Court then went on to conclude that the officer did not have any basis on which he 
could conclude that the defendant was armed and suppressed the cocaine that was discovered. Id. 
atH22. 
Likewise in our case, an officer cannot just make a blanket assumption that because he 
may have been involved in other situations involving drugs where he feared for his safety, that he 
is also justified in this case to have enough of a concern to conduct a Terry frisk of Mr. Peterson 
and subsequently of a coat found on the floor of the closet after Mr. Peterson had been removed 
from the room. This case does not involve any of the crimes the Court of Appeals listed as 
crimes where an officer is justified in conducting a Terry frisk because of the nature of the 
crimes. Instead this case involves simple possession of narcotics, which falls into line with the 
crimes where an officer is not justified in conducting a Terry frisk absent more compelling, 
specific and particular facts that lead an officer to believe a defendant is armed. This additional 
information is simply not present in our case. 
The only remaining factors that could have possibly lead to a justified fear that Mr. 
Peterson was armed and posed a threat to officers was his quick exit from the closet and possibly 
the reduced light in the room. However, any reasonable fears an officer may have had were 
quickly dispelled after Mr. Peterson immediately complied with officer Billings' orders to stop, 
turn around and place his hands behind his back. Officer Billings then frisked Mr. Peterson and 
discovered no weapons. Following this set of events, any fear Officer Billings had for his safety 
was simply not justified 
Any further reasonable fear of danger to officer safety created following the above stated 
events would have been of the officer's own making. If Officer Billings and a reasonable concern 
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was taking place. Id. at ^ 3. The officer then observed the car pull away from the curb. Id. at ^ 4. 
The officer followed the car and after observing a lane change violation he initiated a stop. IcL 
The officer approached the car and asked for a driver's license which the defendant readily 
provided. Id. The license was expired however, the defendant told the officer that although this 
licence was expired that he in fact had a valid current license that had been stolen. IcL The officer 
subsequently found out that the defendant had a suspended license for failure to pay fines. Id. at ^ 
6. The officer then decided to impound the car, so he asked the defendant to step out of the car. 
Id. The officer testified that he did not suspect the defendant of being armed however, he 
conducted a Terry frisk anyway. IdL During the frisk of his person, a small amount of cocaine 
was discovered. Id at If 7. 
In reviewing the this case the Court of Appeals points out, "a mere unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch is not sufficient." Id. at f 14, (quoting State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 
(Utah 1985)). Furthermore, the Court articulated, 
it may be reasonable for an officer to frisk a suspect who has been stopped based 
upon a suspicion that he is engaging in criminal activity for which an offender 
would likely be armed, it does not follow that officers are free to frisk any 
individual suspected of any crime. Crimes that, by their nature, suggest the 
presence of weapons include: "robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons, 
homicide, and dealing in large quantities of narcotics.'" (Citation omitted). "But 
for other types of crimes, such as trafficking in small quantities of narcotics, 
possession of marijuana, illegal possession of liquor, prostitution, 
bookmaking, shoplifting, underage drinking, driving under the influence and 
lesser traffic offenses, minor assault without weapons, or vagrancy," there 
must be particular facts which lead the officer to believe a suspect is armed. 
Id. at 115 (emphasis added). 
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that some sort of weapon may have been hidden in the coat on the floor of the closet, his option 
was to leave the coat on the floor instead of delivering a potential weapon to Mr. Peterson. Thus, 
any exigency created would have been of Officer Billing's own making. The Court of Appeals 
has held that any threat to police must occur before a search is conducted. State v. Beavers, 859 
P.2d 9,18 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Any fears in this case, subsequent to the detention and frisk of 
Mr. Peterson, did not occur as a result of Mr. Peterson's behavior, rather they occurred because 
of police conduct which simply cannot be the basis on which an officer may base a reasonable 
fear for his safety thus justifying a search of the coat. In other words, the police may not create 
their own exigency in order to justify a search. Id. at 19. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances and the applicable case law, it is abundantly 
clear that the warrantless search of Mr. Peterson's coat was not justified, any fears officer's had 
following Mr. Peterson's detention, frisk and removal from the area were not reasonable and that 
if any safety concern arose after those events the concern was caused by the officer's own 
behavior. Thus, any search of the coat was illegal and the evidence discovered by that search 
should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above authorities and arguments, Mr. Peterson respectfully requests this 
Court to reconsider it's decision to not suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the 
warrantless search of his personal property. 
DATED this 0 6 day of January, 2002 * 
JAREDW.ELDRIDGE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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